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The question addressed is whether the adoption of incentive regulation, which has become an important
regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States, has resulted in a change in the
technical eﬃciency of local exchange carriers in the United States. After providing an overview of the
nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical eﬃciency and its change is intro-
duced. This is a multiple-output/multiple-input distance function approach to measuring technical eﬃ-
ciency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988–2001 period
indicate that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local
loops, there was no change in technical eﬃciency between the 1988–1990 period and the 1991–2001 period,
something that incentive regulation was speciﬁcally designed to promote.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
From the initial formal analysis by Averch and Johnson [2], concerns have centered on the
potential for economic ineﬃciencies associated with rate of return regulation. It was demonstrated
that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm under rate of return regulation fails to minimize the cost of pro-
ducing any observed level of output, that these productive ineﬃciencies might be large, and that
the ﬁrm might even build up its rate base by selling competitive outputs at a price below marginal
cost [61]. Although a number of questions have been raised over the years about the original
analysis, many of the basic concerns about rate of return regulation persist [30,51,52].E-mail address: nuri@fcc.gov (N.D. Uri).
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ulation, it was not abandoned in the telecommunications industry until the decade of the 1980s.
The developments crucial to ushering in the era of incentive regulation which replaced rate of
return regulation in telecommunications are discussed in the Notice of Inquiry in the Matter of
Price Cap Performance Review for AT&T (7 FCC Rcd No. 17). In this Notice of Inquiry (NOI),
two factors are identiﬁed including the increasing degree of competition and rapid changes in
technology in telecommunications markets as the rationale for adopting incentive regulation.
Incentive regulation has a number of desirable properties. These include technical eﬃciency,
dynamic eﬃciency, enhanced service quality and consumer welfare, and reduced costs of regu-
lation [34]. Incentive regulation plans also often have socially beneﬁcial equity and redistribu-
tional properties. Thus, preserving low basic local service rates is a common property of incentive
plans. In some situations, a precondition for earnings sharing or other departures from strict rate
of return regulation is a freeze on basic local service rates for the duration of the incentive plan.
Rate stability is a broader, but related, objective of incentive regulation [32]. Additional desirable
properties suggested by Littlechild [36], one of the earliest proponents of incentive regulation,
include the protection of consumers against monopoly, promotion of competition, enhancement
of innovation, and improvement of the proﬁtability of the regulated ﬁrm.
There has been considerable discussion of the extent to which these beneﬁcial objectives can be
realized. Some of this discussion has been at the theoretical level. For example, a comparison
between innovation under rate of return-of-return regulation and under incentive regulation is
provided by Cabral and Riodan [9]. Their results generally support the identiﬁable beneﬁcial
properties of incentive regulation. With incentive regulation, Vogelsang [62,63] demonstrates
convergence to eﬃcient prices (both access and usage) under stationary cost and demand condi-
tions while Brennan [6] ﬁnds that cost and demand change when this convergence does not occur.
With regard to the implementation of incentive regulation, a number of practical concerns have
been raised. For example, Sappington [48] argues that incentive regulation introduces the po-
tential for pure waste and involves the purchase of inputs which have no productive value. Kridel
et al. [32], on the other hand, survey a number of empirical studies that ostensibly provide evi-
dence that productivity, infrastructure investment, proﬁt levels, and new service oﬀerings have
increased under incentive regulation. It appears, therefore, that the attainability of many of the
desirable properties of incentive regulation is an empirical issue.2. Incentive regulation and price caps
Incentive regulation is typically deﬁned as the implementation of rules that encourage a reg-
ulated ﬁrm to achieve desired goals by granting some, but not complete, discretion to the ﬁrm.
Three aspects of this deﬁnition of incentive regulation are important. First, regulatory goals must
be clearly speciﬁed before incentive regulation is designed. The properties of the best incentive
regulation plan will vary according to the goals the plan is designed to achieve. Second, the
regulated ﬁrm is granted some discretion under incentive regulation. For example, while the ﬁrm
may be rewarded for reducing its operating costs, it is not told precisely how to reduce these costs.
Third, the regulator imposes some restrictions on relevant activities or outcomes under incentive
regulation [3,4].
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regulation is to control the prices charged by the regulated ﬁrm, rather than its earnings. Es-
sentially, price cap regulation plans require the regulated ﬁrms average real prices to fall annually
by a speciﬁed percentage [39]. This percentage is nominally referred to as the ‘‘X-factor’’ or the
productivity oﬀset.
In the case of incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) regulated by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, a price cap index (PCI) for common line interstate access and for traﬃc
sensitive switched interstate access is adjusted annually pursuant to the PCI relationship deﬁned in
the Code of Federal Regulations. 1 The PCI relationship consists of a measure of inﬂation, in this
case the Gross Domestic Product Price Index (GDP-PI), minus the X-factor, plus or minus any
permitted exogenous cost changes.
For LEC interstate access service, it has been argued in the Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers in 1995 (10 FCC Rcd at 9002) that applying price cap regulation allows
the Federal Communications Commission as closely as possible to replicate the eﬀects of a
competitive market. 2 That is, competition should be the model for setting just and reasonable
LEC rates based on a PCI because ‘‘Eﬀective competition encourages ﬁrms to improve their
productivity and introduce improved products and services, in order to increase their proﬁts. With
prices set by marketplace forces, the most eﬃcient ﬁrms will earn above-average proﬁts, while less
eﬃcient ﬁrms will earn lower proﬁts, or cease operating. Over time, the beneﬁts of competition
ﬂow to customers and to society, in the form of prices that reﬂect costs, maximize social welfare,
and eﬃciently allocate resources (p. 9002).’’3. Measuring the change in eﬃciency
As noted, whether the desirable properties of incentive regulation are realized is an empirical
issue. What will be examined is whether incentive regulation in the form of price caps has resulted
in an improvement in technical eﬃciency. 3 The focus will be incumbent local exchange carriers
(LECs) in the United States. LECs are involved in three diﬀerent markets where they pro-
duce identiﬁable outputs including local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate ac-
cess to local loops [7]. Incentive regulation, however, is applicable only to interstate access. 41 Section 61.45(b) of the Commissions rules.
2 Note that all Federal Communications Commissions documents referred to are accessible via the Federal
Communications Commissions web site http://www.fcc.gov.
3 Technical eﬃciency is deﬁned to be the proportional reduction in inputs possible for a given level of output in order
to obtain the eﬃcient use of inputs.
4 Interstate access service has grown much more rapidly on average than demand for local service and intrastate
access service. The data on this are clear. Thus, in the presence of economies of density, there is every reason to expect
that productivity enhancements experienced historically in the interstate access market would be substantially greater
than the overall rate of productivity growth experienced by LECs in supplying all services [53]. Most of the productivity
growth experienced in the telecommunications industry is related to reductions in switching costs and to savings in
transmissions costs which occur as a result of using electronics to expand the carrying capacity of transmissions
facilities. In contrast productivity growth in supplying loop services has been relatively lower.
258 N.D. Uri / Appl. Math. Modelling 28 (2004) 255–271Nevertheless, in order to mitigate inferential problems associated with any observable change in
technical eﬃciency, it is necessary to consider all of the outputs in concert.
Productivity is just the ratio of output to input. Productivity changes due to diﬀerences in
production technology, diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of the production process, and diﬀerences in
the environment in which production takes place. The problem is to attribute productivity
variation to these sources and an unattributed residual––Abramovitzs [1] famous ‘‘measure of
our ignorance.’’ Solow [54] sought to attribute output growth to input growth and technical
change by distinguishing movements along a production frontier from shifts in the frontier.
Economies of scale were added to the explanation by Brown and Popkin [8]. David and van de
Klundert [14] allowed technical change to be biased. The eﬀects of scale economies and technical
change on productivity growth were translated into their eﬀects on productions costs by Ohta [46]
and Binswanger [5]. Nishimizu and Page [44], who decomposed productivity into shifts in the
production frontier and movements toward or away from it, attempted to incorporate eﬃciency
change into a model of productivity change. 5
The ability to include eﬃciency change as a component of productivity change depends on the
data that are available and on the assumptions that must be made. A credible assessment of the
role of eﬃciency change in productivity change requires a pooling of cross-sectional and time
series data [28,37].
In the analysis designed to measure the eﬃciency of a multiproduct ﬁrm, there are two com-
monly used approaches 6––the mathematical programming approach and the econometric ap-
proach. 7 The mathematical programming approach known as data envelopment analysis (DEA).
Drawing on the work of Debreu [16] and Koopmans [31], Farrell [21] argued that it is practical to
measure eﬃciency based on a production possibility set consisting of the conical hull of input–
output vectors. This framework was generalized to multiple outputs and reformulated as a
mathematical programming problem by Charnes et al. [10]. The DEA approach does not require
any assumptions about the functional form. The eﬃciency of a LEC is measured relative to all
other LECs with the simple restriction that all LECs lie on or below the eﬃcient frontier.
In the programming method, DEA ‘‘ﬂoats a piecewise linear surface to rest on the top of the
observations [49].’’ The facets of the hyperplane deﬁne the eﬃciency frontier, and the degree of
ineﬃciency is quantiﬁed and partitioned by a series of metrics that measure various distances from
the hyperplane and its facets [35].
A number of diﬀerent econometric approaches to incorporating eﬃciency change into a model
of productivity growth where there are multiple outputs and multiple inputs have been used [25].
The majority of studies have either aggregated the multiple outputs into a single index or modelled
the technology using a dual cost function [33]. These studies require the imposition of a number of
restrictive assumptions including revenue maximization and/or cost minimizing behavior. The
distance function approach which will be used here requires no such set of assumptions.5 There are others who also attempt to do this. See Fare et al. [20] for additional references.
6 There are other approaches including the conventional growth accounting approach and the index number
approach. These are not considered here because they implicitly assume eﬃciency for each time period and hence
provide no insight into the issue of interest [26].
7 These two approaches are sometimes referred to as the nonparametric and the parametric approaches.
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ogy which require data only on input and output quantities. Hence, the measure of productivity
change does not, unlike the Tornqvist index, require data on cost or revenue shares to aggregate
inputs and outputs, yet is capable of measuring the change in total factor productivity in a
multiple-output setting [19].
Following Shephard [50], the output distance function is deﬁned for time period t as 88 T
orient
9 T
10 Odotðxt; ytÞ ¼ inffh : ðxt; yt=hÞ 2 Stg ð1Þ
where xt denotes the input vector, yt denotes the output vector, and St denotes the production
technology set that models the transformation of inputs, xt, into outputs, yt.
This function is deﬁned as the reciprocal of the maximum proportional expansion of the output
vector yt, given inputs xt. It completely characterizes the technology. In particular dotðxt; ytÞ6 1 if
and only if ðxt; ytÞ 2 St. In addition dotðxt; ytÞ ¼ 1 if and only if ðxt; ytÞ is on the boundary or frontier
of technology. In the terminology of Farrell [21], this occurs when production is technically ef-
ﬁcient.
It follows from the deﬁnition of the distance function, dot, that it is nondecreasing, positively
linearly homogeneous of degree one in outputs and convex in y, and decreasing in x. Additionally,
it is the reciprocal of Farrells [21] measure of output technical eﬃciency, which calculates how far
an observation is from the frontier of technology [18].
A variety of approaches have been used to estimate distance functions. These include data
envelopment analysis, parametric deterministic linear programming (PLP), corrected ordinary
least squares (COLS), and stochastic frontier production function (SFP). A number of discussions
and comparisons of these approaches are available (e.g., [11]). In what follows the corrected
ordinary least squares approach will be used. The COLS approach has the advantage of being
fairly straightforward to estimate. Additionally, it allows for conducting conventional hypothesis
tests. Coelli and Perelman [12] conclude that COLS, parametric linear programming, and data
envelopment analysis give consistent results. Their results suggest that there is nothing to rec-
ommend strongly one approach over the others that are available.
A translog speciﬁcation is used for the distance function. 9 The functional form for the distance
function should be ﬂexible, easy to estimate, and permit the imposition of homogeneity. A
translog speciﬁcation has been used successfully in a number of studies (e.g. [27,38]).
The translog distance function for M outputs and K inputs is given as 10ln doi ¼ a0 þ
XM
m¼1
am ln ymi þ 1=2
XM
m¼1
XM
n¼1
amn ln ymi ln yni þ
XK
k¼1
bk ln xki
þ 1=2
XK
k¼1
XK
l¼1
bkl ln xki ln xli þ 1=2
XK
k¼1
XM
m¼1
ckm ln xki ln ymi; i ¼ 1; 2; :::;N ð2Þwhere i denotes the ith ﬁrm in the sample. The time subscript t has been suppressed.he subscript ‘‘o’’ is introduced to emphasize the fact that this is an output-oriented speciﬁcation. An input-
ed speciﬁcation can be deﬁned in an analogous fashion [13,26].
his discussion follows Coelli and Perelman [13].
bserve that ln denotes the natural logarithm (log to the base e).
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implies that the left side of Eq. (2) is equal to zero.
The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree 1 in outputs areXM
m¼1
am ¼ 1 ð3ÞandXM
m¼1
amn ¼ 0; m ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;M ð4ÞandXM
m¼1
ckm ¼ 0; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;K: ð5ÞThe restrictions required for symmetry areamn ¼ anm; m; n ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;M ð6Þ
andbkl ¼ blk; k; l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;K: ð7Þ
A convenient approach for imposing the homogeneity constraint is to follow Lovell et al. [38]
and observe that homogeneity impliesdoðx; cyÞ ¼ cdoðx; yÞ for any c > 0 ð8Þ
Thus, one of the outputs can be arbitrarily chosen, such as the Mth output, with c ¼ 1=ym to
impose this constraint. Then,doðx; y=ymÞ ¼ doðx; yÞ=ym: ð9Þ
For a translog production function, imposition of the homogeneity restriction translates intolnðdoi=ymiÞ ¼ a0 þ
XM1
m¼1
am ln ymi þ 1=2
XM1
m¼1
XM1
n¼1
amn ln ymi ln y

ni þ
XK
k¼1
bk ln xki
þ 1=2
XK
k¼1
XK
l¼1
bkl ln xki ln xli þ 1=2
XK
k¼1
XM1
m¼1
ckm ln xki ln ymi; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N
ð10Þ
where ymi ¼ ymi=yMi.
To simplify the COLS estimation, Eq. (10) can be rewritten aslnðdoi=yMiÞ ¼ Translogðxi; yi=yMi; a; b; cÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N ð11Þ
orlnðdoiÞ  lnðyMiÞ ¼ Translogðxi; yi=yMi; a; b; cÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N ð12Þ
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Comp lnðyMiÞ ¼ Translogðxi; yi=yMi; a; b; cÞ  lnðdoiÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N : ð13Þ
The objective of the COLS estimation is to obtain values of the parameters of the translog
function such that the function ﬁts the data as closely as possible while maintaining the constraint
that 0 < doi6 1 which implies that 1 < lnðdoiÞ6 0.
Greene [24] describes a pragmatic approach to how corrected ordinary least squares can be used.
It is the approach used here. The function is ﬁtted in two steps. The ﬁrst step involves interpreting
the unobservable term lnðdoiÞ in Eq. (13) as a stochastic term and estimating the translog distance
function using ordinary least squares. In the second step, the ordinary least squares estimate of the
intercept term, a0, is adjusted by adding the largest negative ordinary least squares residual so that
the function bounds the observed data points from above. 11 From this, the distance measure for
the ith ﬁrm can be calculated as the exponent of the corrected ordinary least squares residual.4. Empirical implementation
Comprehensive and consistent LEC data are needed to measure the change in productivity of
LECs using a distance function speciﬁcation. To minimize the measurement errors introduced by
the entry of new ﬁrms into the industry, mergers of existing ﬁrms, etc., just the Regional Bell
Operating Companies will be used in the analysis. 12 Fourteen time periods are considered cov-
ering 1988–2001. Price caps for interstate access went into eﬀect in 1991. Use of data before this
period and subsequent to this period will give an indication of whether there has been an iden-
tiﬁable improvement in eﬃciency. The year 1988 is chosen as the earliest time period because data
reporting requirements changed in 1988. Use of earlier data would require making several ad hoc
assumptions to make the data conformable to data for 1988 and later that potentially serve to
obfuscate the issue of interest. It also avoids the problem of using data immediately post-dives-
titure. The period 2001 is chosen because it is the most recent period for which the requisite data
are available. In order to give the best possible insight into productivity change, the greatest level
of disaggregation of the requisite data publicly available is used. Thus, while there are currently
four Regional Bell Operating Companies, data are available for 19 individual LECs. 13here are obviously a number of alternative ways to bound the observed data points from above. For example
er reasonable way to accomplish this would be to add the largest negative ordinary least squares residual plus
small additional value.
he Regional Bell Operating Companies are holding companies. Each Regional Bell Operating Company owns
r more Bell Operating Companies. These Bell Operating Companies correspond closely to the original 22 local
companies that the Justice Department divested from AT&T in 1984. A few of the local phone companies (e.g.,
ern Bell Telephone Company and South Central Bell Telephone Company combined into simply BellSouth) have
eir pre-divestiture identities [17,43]. This is reﬂected in the data that are available.
he 19 LECs include Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company,Michigan Bell Telephone
any, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., Verizon––Delaware, Inc., Verizon––Maryland,
n––New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, Verizon––New Jersey, Inc., Verizon––New York
one Company, Verizon––Pennsylvania, Inc., Verizon––Virginia, Inc., Verizon––Washington, DC, Inc., Veri-
West Virginia, Inc., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Nevada Bell, Paciﬁc Bell, Southwestern Bell Telephone
any, and Qwest Corporation.
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Local exchange carriers provide service in three diﬀerent markets––local service, intrastate toll/
access service, and interstate access to local loops. For these services, characterizing output is not
a trivial undertaking. Output of telephone service includes both access and use. Access and use,
however, are complicated by access and use externalities. The presence of these externalities means
that, contrary to what is typically presumed, preferences are interdependent across subscribers.
That is, as more users gain access to telephone, the utility of customers in the aggregate rises.
These externalities are exceedingly diﬃcult to quantify and are not measured here. Additionally,
output comes in a variety of forms including type (station, person, collect, etc.), time of day, day
of week, distance, and duration [56]. 14
Given these considerations and not dwelling on the complications, 15 three diﬀerent outputs
measures are used––the number of local dial equipment minutes, 16 the number of intraLATA
billed access minutes for interstate calls, and the number of interLATA billed access minutes for
interstate calls. 17 Data on the ﬁrst series were obtained from the public ﬁlings with the Federal
Communications Commission of the Regional Bell Operating Companies. Data on the second
two series were taken from the Statistics of Communications Common Carriers [22]. 18
4.2. Input measures
Based primarily on data availability issues, ﬁve separate inputs are considered including labor,
three diﬀerent types of capital, and materials.
The measure of the quantity labor is based on annual accounting data for the number of
employees from the Federal Communications Commissions Statistics of Communications Common
Carriers. Since there is no objective way to account for the contribution of part-time versus full-
time employees, just the total number of employees is used as the labor input measure. This,
however, does not introduce a substantial bias in the labor quantity measure since part-time
employees accounted for less that 0.7% of the workforce in 1998.14 While output comes in a variety of forms, here has been little change in the quality of this output. That is, the focus
in this study is on wireline telecommunications service and there have been few quality enhancements impacting the
provision of this service. Note that this aspect of quality is not to be confused with service quality, an entirely diﬀerent
issue [59].
15 For example, one complication involves how telephone service is priced (i.e., ﬂat rate versus measured service for
local calls) and hence what the appropriate measure of output is. Note that ﬂat rate service is service whereby for a ﬁxed
amount per month, the customer is given a plain old telephone (POT) and is permitted an unlimited number of calls.
With measured service, the monthly charge is based on the number of calls, the time of day, the distance travelled, and
the length of the call.
16 Dial equipment minutes are the number of minutes a local exchange carriers switch is used for handling calls.
17 IntraLATA calls are calls that originate and terminate in the same local access and transport area (LATA). An
interLATA call is one that is placed within one LATA and received in a diﬀerent LATA. LATA, also called service area
by some Bell Operating Companies, is one of 196 local geographical areas in the United States within which a local
telephone company may oﬀer telecommunications services [43].
18 Note that the Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction only over interLATA interstate calls. It does
not regulate the price of this service. What it does regulate is the rate that LECs can charge IXCs for providing switched
access service to their network. It is the IXCs who provide interstate service (log distance calls).
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ment, central oﬃce transmission equipment, and cable and wire facilities. 19 The primary sources of
growth in LEC productivity are in switching and in transmission. Hence, it is desirable to consider
these separately [57].
The starting point for the compilation of data on capital input is the measurement of the capital
stock. The perpetual inventory method is employed to estimate the level of each component of the
capital stock [23].
The perpetual inventory method is used to remove embedded inﬂation that would distort the
measurement of capital. The application of the perpetual inventory model relies on Federal
Communications Commissions depreciation rates. Unadjusted capital addition data were ob-
tained from the Statistics of Communications Common Carriers [22].
A composite asset price index is needed. First, Bureau of Economic Analysis asset prices were
obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). These included prices for
three asset categories including Communications Equipment, Telecommunication Structures, and
a composite asset price for Producer Durables. Capital additions data are then grouped into
categories corresponding to the NIPA asset categories, and each categorys share calculated.
Materials input quantity is derived by dividing materials expense by a materials price index.
Materials expense is just total operating expense minus the sum of total labor compensation,
depreciation and amortization expense. The materials price index was obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and is based on materials purchases of communications industries.5. Measuring eﬃciency of LECs
Before turning to the estimation results, a few details need to be addressed. First, since the data
begin in 1988 and price caps were adopted in 1991, it is important to test whether there was any
identiﬁable structural shift in the distance function between the two periods, 1988–1990 and 1991–
2001. 20 In this regard each of the parameters was considered separately and a variable coeﬃcient
speciﬁcation considered. 21 The results are voluminous and not reproduced here. (They are
available upon request.) Just one of the estimated coeﬃcients indicated a structural change. 22
This is most likely a spurious result. As an alternative to this test, a Chow test was performed with
no symmetry constraints imposed. The value of the computed test statistic is 1.17. This is dis-
tributed as F ð47; 219Þ. With a critical value of 1.42, the null hypothesis of no structural change is
accepted. This is consistent with the other tests.19 Note that the use of these measures of capital can be aﬀected by lumpy capital investment. Unfortunately,
alternatives such as depreciation on current replacement cost are simply not available.
20 While the time period 1988–1990 is relatively short, there are no particular anomalies aﬀecting the telecommu-
nications industry during this period to suggest that spurious results might arise.
21 The coeﬃcient for 1991 and later was allowed to be diﬀerent than the 1988–1990 coeﬃcient. This was accomplished
by introducing an appropriate qualitative (dummy) variable.
22 The coeﬃcient c21 (input/output combination of central oﬃce switching equipment and the number of intraLATA
billed access minutes) showed a slight (5%) decline.
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hold. These restrictions were tested pairwise. 23 As before, the results are voluminous and not
reproduced but are available upon request. In no instance was the null hypothesis of symmetry
rejected at the 5% level.
The corrected ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters for Eq. (10) are presented in
Table 1. The homogeneity constraint was imposed by dividing the number of intraLATA billed
access minutes for interstate calls, y1, and the number of interLATA billed access minutes for
intrastate calls, y2, by the number of local dial equipment minutes, y3. Recall that the inputs in-
clude three measures of capital input including central oﬃce switching equipment, x1, central
oﬃce transmission equipment, x2, and cable and wire facilities, x3, labor, x4, and materials, x5. The
computed coeﬃcients resulting from the imposition of the homogeneity constraints are not re-
ported. Their calculation is straightforward.
The estimation results are well behaved––the estimates being fairly robust 24 and the data ﬁt the
speciﬁcation satisfactorily with a coeﬃcient of determination in excess of 0.99. The ﬁrst order
input coeﬃcients sum to a value greater than one suggesting the presence of increasing returns to
scale at the mean. When used in conjunction with the standard errors of the estimates, however, it
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale at the 5% level. The second
order cross-product terms, a12 and a13, have the correct signs required for the transformation
function to have a concave shape. 256. Technical eﬃciency of production
Estimation of the distance function permits computation of the technical eﬃciency of pro-
duction of individual LECs via relationship (10). 26 Results of this computation are reported in
Table 2. Before discussing these results, it is important to reiterate that the eﬃciency measure
relates to the combined provision of three services provided by LECs including local service,
intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops.
Two separate time periods are considered––1988–1990 and 1991–2001. This is done in order to
determine whether there has been any identiﬁable change in technical eﬃciency in response to the
implementation of price caps. For individual LECs, the mean values of technical eﬃciency used in
conjunction with the standard deviations for the two periods indicate that for none of the LECs
was there a change in technical eﬃciency in response to the adoption of price caps. This, as noted23 That is, a likelihood ratio test was used. In implementing the test, the log of the likelihood function was computed
for both the unrestricted and the restricted speciﬁcations for an individual coeﬃcients subject to symmetry, e.g.,
b12 ¼ b21. Then, 2 times the diﬀerence in the log likelihood functions has a Chi-square distribution with the number of
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions [15]. In this case, the number of restrictions in one.
24 Ancillary analyses looked at diﬀerent sample conﬁgurations and variable deﬁnitions. These analyses yielded results
consistent with those reported here.
25 That is, the ﬁrst order partial derivatives of these statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates are positive.
26 Technical eﬃciency is the proportional reduction in inputs possible for a given level of output in order to obtain
the eﬃcient input use. Allocative eﬃciency measures the ability of the LEC to use the inputs in optimal proportions,
given their respective prices. The two measures can be combined to give a measure of total eﬃciency.
Table 1
Parameter estimates for the distance function
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient estimatea
a0 )0.1515 (0.0381)
a1 0.1272 (0.0519)
a2 0.6103 (0.2634)
a11 )0.1570 (0.0412)
a12 0.1967 (0.0924)
a13 0.1616 (0.0300)
b1 0.2717 (0.0809)
b2 0.5161 (0.1573)
b3 0.1318 (0.0408)
b4 0.1276 (0.0555)
b5 0.0902 (0.0295)
b11 0.7288 (0.3322)
b12 )0.0018 (0.0285)
b13 )0.0883 (0.0297)
b14 0.1404 (0.0513)
b15 0.0022 (0.0008)
b22 )0.0845 (0.0417)
b23 0.0669 (0.0476)
b24 )0.1913 (0.0770)
b25 0.0513 (0.0242)
b33 )0.1820 (0.0860)
b34 0.0976 (0.0255)
b35 )0.0767 (0.0405)
b44 0.6515 (0.2213)
b45 )0.0651 (0.0462)
b55 )0.1703 (0.0559)
c11 )0.0899 (0.0305)
c21 0.0636 (0.0122)
c31 0.0360 (0.0359)
c41 0.0857 (0.0382)
c51 0.0026 (0.0015)
c12 0.0523 (0.0172)
c22 0.0965 (0.0409)
c32 )0.0090 (0.0173)
c42 )0.0412 (0.1160)
c52 0.0089 (0.0080)
Log of the likelihood function 35.116
R2 0.9957
a Standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.
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promote.
For the 1991–2001 period, technical eﬃciency ranges from a low of 0.66 (Wisconsin Bell, Inc.)
to a high of 0.88 (Verizon––West Virginia). The variability across LECs, however, in technical
eﬃciency is relatively modest. There is no discernable trend between LECs as to why one has a
slightly better technical eﬃciency measure than another.
Table 2
Average technical eﬃciency for LECs: 1988–1990 and 1991–2001a
LEC Technical eﬃciency
1988–1990
Technical eﬃciency
1991–2001
Illinois Bell Telephone Company 0.7015 (0.0149) 0.6974 (0.0530)
Indiana Bell Telephone Company 0.7437 (0.0555) 0.7804 (0.0775)
Michigan Bell Telephone Company 0.7858 (0.0139) 0.7555 (0.0409)
The Ohio Bell Telephone Company 0.8041 (0.0112) 0.7876 (0.0626)
Wisconsin Bell, Inc. 0.7017 (0.0140) 0.6602 (0.0657)
Verizon––Delaware, Inc. 0.7643 (0.0147) 0.7205 (0.0256)
Verizon––Maryland 0.7686 (0.0498) 0.7919 (0.0316)
Verizon––New England Telephone and Telegraph Company 0.7345 (0.0115) 0.7432 (0.0399)
Verizon––New Jersey, Inc. 0.6783 (0.0401) 0.6907 (0.0450)
Verizon––New York Telephone Company 0.7562 (0.0245) 0.7698 (0.0481)
Verizon––Pennsylvania, Inc. 0.6801 (0.0433) 0.7336 (0.0327)
Verizon––Virginia, Inc. 0.8115 (0.0260) 0.8081 (0.0380)
Verizon––Washington, DC, Inc. 0.7730 (0.0168) 0.7578 (0.0170)
Verizon––West Virginia, Inc. 0.8356 (0.0054) 0.8823 (0.0594)
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 0.7206 (0.0179) 0.7627 (0.0504)
Nevada Bell 0.7563 (0.0617) 0.7398 (0.0577)
Paciﬁc Bell 0.8208 (0.0150) 0.7665 (0.0431)
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 0.7507 (0.0415) 0.7692 (0.0307)
Qwest Corporation 0.7756 (0.0350) 0.7445 (0.0576)
a Standard errors of the averages are in parentheses.
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nations. For example, while total factor productivity increased over the 1988–1998 period [58],
this growth most likely was due to innovation rather than improvements in technical eﬃciency.
Relatively large increases in investment in both central oﬃce switching equipment and cable and
wire facilities were made over this period. In the case of switching equipment, major investments
were made, for example, in frame relays 27 and ATM. 28 For cable and wire facilities, substantial
investments were made in optical ﬁber. 29 The increase in the demand for access to the Internet as
well as the need by businesses to transfer large amounts of data have driven the growth in in-
vestment designed to transfer higher levels of bandwidth at faster rates [57]. Thus, investments did
not translate into technical eﬃciency improvements.
Another important factor is that with the elimination of rate of return regulation, the returns
realized by LECs has been growing signiﬁcantly since 1991 and hence there is not the perceived
need on the part of LECs to enhance eﬃciency. They are so proﬁtable that whatever incentive
created by price cap regulation is negated by the relatively large and growing realized rate of
return. From the allowed (regulated) rate of return of 11.25% in 1990, the rate of return for price27 Frame relay services employ a form of packet switching. The packets are in the form of frames which are variable
in length.
28 Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) is a high bandwidth, low-delay, connection-oriented, packet-like switching
and multiplexing technique.
29 Fiber optics is a technology whereby electrical signals are converted into optical signals that are transported
through glass ﬁber and then reconverted by receivers at the other end into electrical signals.
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2000. In 2001 it stood at 19.7% [60].7. Comparison
How do the results obtained here compare with similar studies of industries subject to incentive
regulation? Unfortunately, there is a dearth of studies that speciﬁcally look at the technical eﬃ-
ciency impact of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry. 30 There are just a few
such studies. Tardiﬀ and Taylor [55] test whether aﬀects the rate of total factor producti-
vity growth over time. 31 Measuring total factor productivity using the conventional growth ac-
counting approach, they pool cross-section and time series data over the period 1984–1990 for
large LECs in the United States. They conclude that incentive regulation increases annual pro-
ductivity growth by about 2.8%. 32 This increase in productivity is driven equally by higher output
and lower input growth. Tardiﬀ and Taylor also ﬁnd that LECs that operate under incentive
regulation are able to produce the same output with about 6% less labor than LECs that do not
operate under incentive regulation.
Another study that explicitly looks at the eﬀect of incentive regulation on LEC productivity is
that by Majumdar [41]. 33 Using data envelopment analysis based on three outputs and three
inputs for the period 1988–1993, 34 Majumdar ﬁnds that price caps plans as a replacement for rate
of return regulation has a marginally statistically signiﬁcant positive, but lagged, eﬀect on the
technical eﬃciency of local exchange carriers. It is claimed that the impact of price caps on scale30 A generic review of studies on the eﬀects of incentive regulation is provided by Kridel et al. [32].
31 Tardiﬀ and Taylor [55] look at productivity gains associated with local (intraLATA) toll calls. The concern of the
analysis in this paper is with interLATA (long distance) calls. A LATA is a local access and transport area. A number of
states implemented price cap plans for local toll calls before they were implemented by the FCC for long distance calls.
Tardiﬀ and Taylor rely on state-level data for their analysis.
32 Uri [58] examines the shortcomings associated with using the conventional growth accounting approach for total
factor productivity in the telecommunications industry. In and of itself, the fact that the rate of change in productivity is
diﬀerent between the Tardiﬀ–Taylor study based on conventional growth accounting and what one would obtain by
using, say, a Malmquist index approach is not surprising. The Malmquist index approach is based completely on
physical measures of inputs and outputs and thereby avoids many of the biases that are associated with the
conventional growth accounting approach to measuring the rate of change in productivity. The conventional growth
accounting approach introduces another potential problem in using shares to aggregate inputs. If observed shares are
not cost minimizing shares (i.e., if factors of production are not paid their value of marginal products as assumed in the
conventional growth accounting approach), the resulting measure of total factor productivity will be biased. That is,
any technical or allocative ineﬃciency will appear as a deviation in productivity between the two approaches.
33 This study is an update of Majumdar [40].
34 The outputs consist of the number of local calls, the number of intrastate toll calls, and the number of interstate
calls. There are signiﬁcant limitations associated with these output measures and discussed in Appendix B (The 1999
Staﬀ TFP Study by Noel D. Uri) in Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 94-1, Released November
15, 1999. The major problem is that they do not accurately portray the growth in LEC output. Inputs consist of
switches, number of lines, and number of employees. These measures of inputs also suﬀer limitations because they do
not account for all LEC inputs. A extended discussion of the appropriate output and input measures to use in
measuring LEC productivity can be found in Comments and Reply Comments to CC Docket No. 94-1 ﬁled in January
2000. These, as noted previously, can be accessed via the Federal Communications Commission web site.
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For neither technical eﬃciency nor scale eﬃciency are the eﬀects of price caps on productivity
quantiﬁed. More recently, Majumdar [42], based on essentially the same data used in the previous
study but using an econometric approach instead of data envelopment analysis, ﬁnds that in-
centive regulation does aﬀect the deployment of new technology and, implicitly, productivity. The
extent of this eﬀect is not quantiﬁed.
One ﬁnal study examining the eﬀects of incentive regulation on productivity is that by Resende
[47]. This study is very similar to that of Majumdar, using three inputs and three outputs for the
period 1988–1993 and focusing just on the impact of incentive regulation on local telephony
productivity. 35 Resende ﬁnds that, after correcting for technological change, incentive regulation
does lead to a higher level of technical eﬃciency. 368. Conclusion
Incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry in the United States was adopted in
1991 for local exchange carriers providing interstate access service and was intended as a way to
improve the technical eﬃciency of local exchange carriers. After providing an overview of the
nature of incentive regulation and its desirable properties, a methodology for measuring technical
eﬃciency and its change is introduced. This is a distance function approach measuring technical
eﬃciency. It is capable of representing multiple outputs and multiple inputs. A translog speciﬁ-
cation is adopted for the distance function. In implementing the approach, data on three outputs
and ﬁve inputs for 19 local exchange carriers covering the period 1988–2001 are used. The results
of implementing this approach suggest that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access
service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no identiﬁable change in technical eﬃciency
between the 1988–1990 period and the 1991–2001 period, something that incentive regulation was
speciﬁcally designed to do. Finally, an assessment of technical eﬃciency across individual LECs in
the United States indicates little variability.Acknowledgements
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